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Abstract. This paper highlights the role of risk neutral investors in generating endogenous bub-
bles in derivatives markets. We find that a market for derivatives, which has all the features of a
perfect market except completeness and has some risk neutral investors, can exhibit extreme price
movements which represent a violation to the Gaussian random walk hypothesis. This can be viewed
as a paradox because it contradicts wide-held conjectures about prices in informationally efficient
markets with rational investors. Our findings imply that prices are not always good approximations
of the fundamental values of derivatives, and that extreme price movements like price peaks or
crashes may have endogenous origin and happen with a higher-than-normal frequency.
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1 Introduction
The present study addresses the role of risk neutral investors in generating turmoil in
financial markets. Our hypothesis is that, in derivatives markets, random trades made
by risk neutral investors and based on arbitrage free valuation can move prices away
from their fundamental values. This effect can improve market instability by leading to
abrupt price adjustments towards their fundamental values. These adjustments can take
the form of either price peaks or price crashes, have an endogenous origin and can happen
systematically.
Our main result consists in the demonstration of the existence of a price anomaly, that
we have called the risk neutral valuation paradox. The paradox is a consequence of the fun-
damental theorem of asset pricing and the related martingale theory of bubbles. Following
⋆ I wish to thank Prof. Marco Vannini for being my mentor and Prof. Angelo Antoci for considerate guidance
during my studies. I also wish to thank Prof. Martin Schweizer for precious comments on a previous draft and
Dr Andrea Pinna and Dr Claudio Detotto for useful talks on the seminal stages of the research. This work
is part of a joint research program sponsored by the Department of Economics of the University of Sassari
and the Regione Autonoma della Sardegna under the regional law n. 7/2007. I also gratefully acknowledge the
support to research provided by the Doctoral School in Law and Economics of the University of Sassari.
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these theories, prices in a derivatives market can diverge from their fundamental values if
and only if the market is incomplete. Thus, we intend to demonstrate our assumption in
a market that has all the properties of a perfect market except completeness.
We define a competitive economy of pure exchange with uncertainty. We consider
a single consumption good, which acts as nume´raire. Agents are interested in certain
consumption at present time and in state contingent consumption on future dates. There
is an underlying asset, composed by the sequence of realizations xt(ω) of the stochastic
process Xt. A realization xt(ω) represents the contingent consumption gained or lost at
date t by the owner of the underlying asset if the state is ω. Tradable assets consist in
the underlying asset and the set of its derivatives. We consider continuous trading dates.
The market is incomplete so that price bubbles might come into existence.
Agents aim only at maximizing their expected utility. They differ for risk attitudes
and can be divided into the two groups of risk averse and risk neutral.
Risk averse agents will determine, for each tradable consumption bundle and according
to their subjective expected utility, a reservation price which will constitute a bound for
their willingness to trade. We name their strategy as ‘fundamental trading’.
Risk neutral agents, under some assumptions, are indifferent between the choices of
buying, selling or not trading at all any consumption bundle, and will switch from one
action to the other randomly over time. However, given their choice of buying or selling,
they will be available to, respectively, bid more or ask less than the current market price,
because the choice affects their price expectation through Bayesian updating. We name
their strategy as ‘technical trading’.
We show that, in a market where all agents operate as fundamental traders, the price
process is bounded. We define such market as ‘non speculative market’.
Once that an equilibrium price is reached, risk neutral agents can start to operate as
technical traders. We demonstrate that the entrance of technical traders in the market
leads the price process to follow a locally unbounded Brownian motion; thus, there exists
a positive probability that the market price may exit from the boundaries that previously
existed when only fundamental traders were operating.
When the market price stays inside the boundaries of a non speculative market, we
define the market conditions as ‘normal’. When it goes outside these boundaries, we define
the market conditions as either ‘depression’ or ‘bubble’, depending if the price stays,
respectively, below or above the boundaries. In these cases, the market bears the risk of
an abrupt price adjustment towards its fundamental values. Indeed, if risk neutral agents
stop to operate as technical traders, even for an instant, the market becomes again non
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speculative and the price goes back into the boundaries via an abrupt price adjustment.
These adjustments can take the form of either price peaks or crashes and their frequency
will sum up to the normal price movements, thus affecting the tails of the distribution of
price movements.
The paper starts with a brief exposition of the theoretical foundation (sect. 2) and
the mathematical formalization of the economic environment (sect. 3). The paper follows
with the definition of the model and the demonstration of the paradox (sect. 4). Finally,
conclusions are drawn (sect. 5).
2 Theoretical Foundation
The paradox that we propose is a consequence of what is known as the ‘fundamental
theorem of asset pricing’, which is at the core of the arbitrage pricing theory. The funda-
mental theorem states that the absence of free lunch in a frictionless market is equivalent
to the existence of an equivalent martingale probability measure, under which all assets
have the same expected return, and that this measure is unique if and only if the market
is complete.
The foundations of the arbitrage pricing theory in modern finance are provided by
Black and Scholes [3] and by Merton [34] in their celebrated contributions on option
valuation. Cox and Ross [6] introduce the concept of risk neutral valuation and argue
that in a market with no arbitrage opportunities, it is possible to reassign probabilities
to give all assets the same expected returns. Harrison and Kreps [18], Kreps [29] and
Harrison and Pliska [19] make a breakthrough in arbitrage pricing theory and give a
rigorous foundation to the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. They use Itoˆ calculus
to define the concept of no-arbitrage, refer to risk neutral probabilities as the ‘equivalent
martingale measure’, and demonstrate the fundamental theorem for trading strategies
that are simple integrands. These results were extended in various directions, among the
others1, by Dalang, Morton and Willinger [8], while Delbaen [10] and Schachermayer [42]
prove the theorem for special cases.2
A general version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is provided by Delbaen
and Schachermayer [11] [12]. They extend the theorem for trading strategies that are
general integrands. Furthermore, they decline the no-arbitrage condition under the fun-
damental concept of ‘no free lunch with vanishing risk’ and they show that such condition
1 See also: Dybvig and Huang [14], Duffie and Huang [13], Stricker [46], Ansel and Stricker [1] and Lakner [31].
2 Simple proofs are also proposed by Schachermayer [41], Kusuoka [30], Kabanov and Kramkov [27] and Rogers
[38].
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is fulfilled if and only if there exists an equivalent probability measure under which the
price process is a sigma martingale or, in the continuous case, a local martingale.
The literature and theories discussed above are at the base of what is sometimes
called the ‘martingale theory of bubbles’.3 Harrison and Kreps [17] provide the classical
definition of the fundamental value of an asset as the value of its discounted cash flows
under the equivalent martingale measure. Therefore, a bubble would originate from the
deviation between the fundamental value of an asset and its market price. This theory
focuses on the characteristics of asset bubbles and the evaluation of derivative securities
in economies which satisfy the no arbitrage condition.
The theory of bubbles in the classical economic framework requires considerably
stricter conditions than in the martingale approach. Indeed, in economic equilibrium
models, the price function requires a precise definition of additional characteristics of
the economy, such as the functions of supply and demand.4
In the martingale theory of bubbles, the no arbitrage condition is often imposed in the
form of ‘no free lunch with vanishing risk’ (NFLVR) proposed by Delbaen and Schacher-
mayer [11]. In the models proposed by Loewenstein and Willard [32] [33], by Cox and
Hobson [5], and by Heston, Loewenstein and Willard [21], bubbles can violate numerous
classical option pricing theorems including the put-call parity. This result is only par-
tially supported by empirical evidence.5 To overcome this limitation, Jarrow, Protter and
Shimbo [25] [26] impose the further condition of no dominance6 of portfolios. This con-
dition is stronger that the NFLVR but still substantially weaker than imposing a market
equilibrium. They show that the addition of the no dominance condition excludes all asset
price bubbles in complete markets with infinite trading horizons, because the fundamen-
tal values of assets and their market prices should always be identical. Consequently, if
bubbles are to exist, the market should be incomplete.
According to the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, an incomplete market presents
a wide range of different martingale measures that may be used for estimating the fun-
damental values of assets. Eberlein and Jacod [15] suggest that these martingale mea-
sures and, consequently, the prices of derivatives should have a closed range of variation.
3 See for example Jarrow and Protter [24].
4 We recall the contributions on asset bubbles in classical economic frameworks proposed by Tirole [47] and
Santos and Woodford [39] on markets with finite trading horizon and rational expectations, by Tirole [48],
O’Connell and Zeldes [35] and Weil [50] on markets with rational traders and infinite trading horizon, and by
De Long et al. [9] on markets where there are irrational traders. For good reviews, see Camerer [4], Scheinkman
and Xiong [43], and Jarrow, Protter and Shimbo [26].
5 See for example Kamara and Miller [28], and Ofek and Richardson [36].
6 See Merton [34].
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Schweizer and Wissel [44], and Jacod and Protter [22] argue that market prices of deriva-
tives can reveal which one of these martingale measures is the one currently adopted by
the market. Then, a bubble can start (from a situation of non-bubble) when traders decide
to adopt a different martingale measure. In economic terms, this variation will correspond
to a regime change in the core values of the economy (endowments, beliefs, risk aversion,
technologies, institutional structures). In financial terms, the change in the martingale
measure can leave unchanged the price of the underlying security but, as the market is
incomplete, it will change the price of some of its derivative securities. To investigate the
birth of a bubble or its presence in the market is therefore essential to analyze temporal
trends in the prices of derivative securities,7 as we do in this paper.
The contribute of this paper to the theory of financial markets is to highlight the
role of risk neutral investors in generating endogenous bubbles in derivatives markets. In
the following sections, we propose and demonstrate an original paradox of asset pricing.
The paradox suggests that almost perfect derivatives markets may exhibit extreme price
movements, which represent a violation to the Gaussian random walk hypothesis, have
an endogenous origin and may happen with higher-than-normal frequency.
3 The Economic Environment
3.1 Basic Definitions
Let us consider a competitive economy of pure exchange with uncertainty. We are given a
continuous set of trading dates t ∈ [ 0, T ] where t are the instants of time at which market
participants can trade. There is a single consumption good, which acts as nume´raire.
Agents are interested in certain consumption at present time and in state contingent
consumption on future dates. Future consumption is represented by functions of the un-
derlying asset x˜t, which is the vector composed by the sequence of realizations xt(ω) of
the stochastic process Xt. The realization xt(ω) represents the contingent consumption
gained or lost at date t by the owner of the underlying asset x˜t if the state is ω. The
underlying asset and its possible derivative functions form the convex set xsett , which rep-
resents the family of tradable vectors xt that can be created and exchanged at date t. In
other words, xsett represents the securities traded in the market at any given date t. To
improve readability, we will write xt for the generic element of x
set
t .
At each trading date t, agents can exchange any vector of future contingent consump-
tion xt ∈ x
set
t with units of certain present consumption rt. Thus, we consider consumption
7 See also Jarrow, Kchia and Protter [23].
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bundles of the form (rt,xt) where the real number rt represents the units of certain con-
sumption at the present date t and the vector xt represents the units of state contingent
consumptions over the interval ( t, T ].
3.2 Probability Assumptions
Let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] be an adapted ca`dla`g stochastic process on the probability space (Ω, F, P ),
where:
– the universal sample space Ω is the set of all possible elementary outcomes ω ∈ Ω;
– the filtration F is the set of the σ-algebras F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ], where Ft represents the
information available at any time t;
– P is the probability measure on the universal sample space Ω.
The underlying probability space that we define fulfills the usual hypotheses of the
general theory of financial asset pricing. We can interpret Ft as the questions that agents
can answer at time t regarding past and present states of the world. The information
becomes more and more precise (i.e. the set of measurable events increase) as new events
from the present becomes known.
For the purpose of the model, we assume that the information is continuously and
completely available to each individual (and, accordingly, that the filtration is right con-
tinuous). Furthermore, we assume that information is free. Thus, no additional costly
information is available and the model avoids any potential application of the Grossman
and Stiglitz paradox [16] on the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. We
also assume, with no loss of relevance, that investors have common prior beliefs on the
probability of future events.
3.3 Market Participants
We define rationality in strictly axiomatic form, according to von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [49] and Savage [40]. Furthermore, we assume that all the individuals operating in
the market are rational.
We denote the set of conceivable agents with A. The i-th agent is characterized at
each date t by an initial endowment (rˆit, xˆ
i
t) and by a preference relation %i over the
space of consumption bundles (rt,xt). Preferences depend on the subjective degree of risk
aversion and are assumed to be complete, transitive, convex, continuous, strictly increasing
and independent. Following these properties, the agent is able to express the preferences
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towards consumption bundles via an additive von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui : (rt,xt)→ R.
Agents aim only at maximizing their expected utility and choose the strategies that
they repute best performing. There are two possible alternative strategies: ‘fundamental
trading’ and ‘technical trading’, both consisting of simple integrands.
Fundamental traders consist of risk averse agents. For each tradable consumption
bundle, they estimate a reservation price according to their subjective expected utility.
Then, they will be available to make any trade that is available in the market at more
favourable conditions than its reservation price.
Technical traders consist of risk neutral agents who assume that other risk neutral
agents are operating and that the price process follows a Brownian motion. Under these
assumptions, they will be indifferent between the choices of buying, selling or not trading
at all a given consumption bundle, and will switch from one action to the other randomly
over time. However, given their choice of either buying or selling, they will be available
to, respectively, bid more or ask less than the current market price, because the choice
affects their price expectation of the consumption bundle through Bayesian updating.
Although each agent can both buy and sell, we prefer to consider each trader as
two different individuals, one that exclusively buy and the other that exclusively sell.
Then, from the intersection of the different categories, we can formally define the set of
conceivable agents A : {FB, FS, TB, TS} as composed by the distinct subgroups of
fundamental traders that are buyers, FB, and sellers, FS, and by the technical traders
that are buyers, TB, and sellers, TS.
As said above, the number of technical traders varies randomly over time depending on
the choices of risk neutral investors between indifferent alternatives (buying, selling, not
trading). Thus, we will also use, when convenient, the notation TBt and TSt to denote
the sets of risk neutral agents operating as technical traders (respectively, buyers and
sellers) at a specific time t.
3.4 Trading System
Exchanges happen within an electronic trading system. Agents submit orders to the elec-
tronic system, which immediately searches for matching orders; in case they exist, the
system executes the trade and remits the nume´raire to the traders. To be more precise,
when a consumption bundle (rt,xt) is traded, the system remits immediately the payment
rt to the seller and, from then inwards, it pays or subtracts to the buyer (as it accrues)
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the contingent consumption generated by xt. Agents go bankrupt and must exit from the
market if their wealth represented by units of certain consumption is wiped out by losses.
Agents’ trading orders can be of four types:
– the limited order of buying, Bid i(xt), which expresses the maximum amount of certain
present consumption that an agent i ∈ FB is willing to offer for buying a vector of
future contingent consumption xt;
– the limited order of selling, Ask i(xt), which expresses the minimum amount of certain
present consumption that an agent i ∈ FS is willing to accept for selling a vector of
future contingent consumption xt;
– the market order of buying, Buy i(xt), which expresses the will of an agent i ∈ TB to
buy a given vector of future contingent consumption xt at any price, as long as it is
the market-clearing price Equil (xt) plus a small sum ǫ;
– the market order of selling, Sell i(xt), which expresses the will of an agent i ∈ TS to
sell a given vector of future contingent consumption xt at any price, as long as it is
the market-clearing price Equil (xt) minus a small sum ǫ.
We assume that the market orders of buying and selling, Buy(xt) and Sell(xt), put,
respectively, upward and downward pressure on the market-clearing price, Equil (xt). The
final effect on the price at time t+dt depends on which of the two sets of technical traders,
buyers TB or sellers TS, is larger at time t.
The element ǫ can be interpreted as the Bayesian updating of price expectations of
technical agents due to their choice of buying or selling. We can also interpret ǫ as a
small sum that agents should add or subtract to the market-clearing price Equil (xt) to
make sure that their market orders of buying or selling, Buy(xt) and Sell(xt), would be
executed.
The market-clearing price, Equil (xt) is determined according to a price function of
the form:
Equil(xt) := f
{
BidFB(xt), AskFS(xt), BuyTB(xt), SellTS(xt), Equil(xt−dt)
}
7→ R, (1)
where BidFB(xt) and AskFS(xt) are the sets of trading orders from fundamental traders
that are, respectively, buyers and sellers, and BuyTB(xt) and SellTS(xt) are the sets of
trading orders from technical traders that are, respectively, buyers and sellers.
The price function in formula (1) is expressed in general form only for the purpose of
demonstrating the existence of the paradox. A more precise definition will be necessary
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to extend the results and define carefully how the random variations of the prices look
over time.
4 The Model
In the present section, we intend to demonstrate that, when no risk neutral investor is
operating as technical trader, the price function in formula (1) becomes bounded. On the
other hand, when some risk neutral investors are operating in the market as technical
traders, the price function follows a locally unbounded Brownian motion.
Then, the demonstration of the risk neutral valuation paradox comes from the alterna-
tion of boundedness and unboundedness of the price process, due to risk neutral investors
who switch randomly over time from fundamental to technical trading and vice versa.
4.1 Basic definitions
Definition 1 (expected utility). The expected utility of a given consumption bundle
(rt, xt) for the i-th agent is the function:
Ui(rt,xt) = E
[
ui(rt,xt)
]
=
∫
Ω
ui
(
rt, xt(ω)
)
P dω, ∀ i ∈ A, (2)
where ui
(
rt, xt(ω)
)
is the utility of the i-th agent conditional on the realization of the
event ω∈Ω, and P is the probability measure on the space of events Ω.
Lemma 1 (preference between consumption bundles). Let ( r˙t, x˙t ) and ( r¨t, x¨t )
be two different consumption bundles. The i-th agent strictly prefers the first bundle to
the second if and only if:
( r˙t, x˙t ) ≻i ( r¨t, x¨t ) ⇐⇒ Ui ( r˙t, x˙t ) > Ui ( r¨t, x¨t ), ∀ i ∈ A. (3)
The i-th agent is indifferent between the two consumption bundles if and only if:
( r˙t, x˙t ) ∼i ( r¨t, x¨t ) ⇐⇒ Ui ( r˙t, x˙t ) = Ui ( r¨t, x¨t ), ∀ i ∈ A. (4)
4.2 Market with only fundamental traders
Proposition 1 (strategy of fundamental traders). A seller i ∈ FS with endow-
ment ( rˆit, xˆ
i
t ) will be willing at date t to receive for a given vector of future contingent
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consumption xt no less than the reservation price Aski (xt), such that:
Ui
(
rˆit + Aski (xt), xˆ
i
t − xt
)
= Ui ( rˆ
i
t, xˆ
i
t ),
E[xt] > 0, Aski(xt) > 0, ∀ i ∈ FS. (5)
A buyer j ∈ FB with endowment ( rˆjt , xˆ
j
t ) will be willing at date t to pay for a given
vector of future contingent consumption xt no more than the reservation price Bidj (xt),
such that:
Uj
(
rˆjt − Bidj (xt), xˆ
j
t + xt
)
= Uj ( rˆ
j
t , xˆ
j
t ),
E[xt] > 0, Bidj(xt) > 0, ∀ j ∈ FB. (6)
Proof. According to the rationality axioms, preferences are strictly increasing:
( rˆit, xˆ
i
t ) ≻i ( rˆ
i
t, xˆ
i
t − xt ), E[xt] > 0, ∀ i ∈ A. (7)
For the property of continuity in preference relations, no consequence is infinitely better
or infinitely worse than any other. Thus, if we add a positive amount of certain current
consumption ǫ to the right-hand side of the relation, there will exist one and only one value
of ǫ such that the i-th agent will be indifferent between the two consumption bundles:
∃ ǫ > 0 =⇒ ( rˆit, xˆ
i
t ) ∼i ( rˆ
i
t + ǫ, xˆ
i
t − xt ). (8)
Let us denote ǫ = Ask i (xt). Then:
∃ ǫ > 0 =⇒ ( rˆit, xˆ
i
t ) ∼i
(
rˆit + Ask i (xt), xˆ
i
t − xt
)
, (9)
which, according to lemma 1, is equivalent to formula (5):
Ui ( rˆ
i
t, xˆ
i
t ) = Ui
(
rˆit + Ask i (xt), xˆ
i
t − xt
)
. (10)
The proof of formula (6) logically follows from that of formula (5). 2
Corollary 1. The exchange of a vector xt between a seller i ∈ FS and a buyer j ∈ FB
can happen only at a price bounded between the reservation prices of the seller, Aski (xt),
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and of the buyer, Bidj (xt):
∃Equil(xt) ⇒ Aski(xt) ≤ Equil(xt) ≤ Bidj(xt), ∀i ∈ FS ∧ ∀j ∈ FB. (11)
Proof. A necessary condition for the exchange is that both seller and buyer prefer to their
initial endowment the consumption bundle resulting from the trade:
∃Equil(xt) =⇒


(
rˆit + Equil(xt), xˆ
i
t − xt
)
%i ( rˆ
i
t, xˆ
i
t ), ∀ i ∈ FS
(
rˆjt − Equil(xt), xˆ
j
t + xt
)
%j ( rˆ
j
t , xˆ
j
t ), ∀ j ∈ FB.
(12)
From formulae (5) and (6), the condition is equivalent to corollary 1:
∃Equil (xt) =⇒


Equil (xt) ≥ Ask i (xt), ∀ i ∈ FS
Equil (xt) ≤ Bid j (xt), ∀ j ∈ FB. 2
(13)
An almost trivial consequence of the previous propositions is that, in a market with
only fundamental traders, the price process of any tradable vector xt ∈ x
set
t is bounded.
Its market-clearing price, Equil(xt), assumes values in the closed interval between the
minimum reservation price among the sellers and the maximum reservation price among
the buyers, and exists if and only such interval exists and is positive:
∃Equil(xt) ⇐⇒ min[AskFS(xt)] ≤ Equil(xt) ≤ max[BidFB(xt)],
max[BidFB(xt)] ≥ min[AskFS(xt)]. (14)
Definition 2. We define the space of Pareto-efficient bargains, Et, as the set:
Et :=
{
(rt, xt) ∈
[
min [AskFS(xt)], max [BidFB(xt)]
]
× xsett
}
. (15)
Any element within the space of Pareto-efficient bargains Et denote a price rt for the asset
xt, at which at least one seller and one buyer (both fundamental traders) may find conve-
nient to make the exchange. The set Et can also be considered as the (closed) codomain
of the function Equil (xsett ).
Let us define an arbitrage opportunity as a trading strategy that does not require
the investment of current consumption, has a positive probability of gaining additional
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consumption and cannot lead to consumption losses. Then, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 2. In a market with only fundamental traders, there are no arbitrage op-
portunities.
Proof. By assumption, the risk free interest rate in the market is zero. Then, in order
to have an arbitrage opportunity, there must exists: a security that has more than one
price in the market, or some replicating portfolios φt and φ
′
t with identical cash flows
and different market-clearing prices. Let us demonstrate per absurdum that this is not
possible. Let us assume that:
∃ xt, x
′
t ∈ x
set
t : xt = x
′
t ∧ Equil(xt) 6= Equil(x
′
t). (16)
Then, according to formula (1), it should result:
f : AskFS(xt)× BidFB(xt) 7→Equil(xt) 6= f : AskFS(x
′
t)× BidFB(x
′
t) 7→Equil(x
′
t), (17)
which for AskFS(xt)× BidFB(xt) = AskFS(x
′
t)× BidFB(x
′
t) is clearly false.
The proof for replicating portfolios with identical cash flows, φt and φ
′
t, logically follows
from the preceding given that, for the transitivity in preferences, it results:
φt ≈ φ
′
t ⇒


Ask i(φt) = Ask i(φ
′
t), ∀ i ∈ FS ⇔ AskFS(φt) = AskFS(φ
′
t)
Bid j(φt) = Bid j(φ
′
t), ∀ j ∈ FB ⇔ BidFB(φt) = BidFB(φ
′
t). 2
(18)
4.3 Market with fundamental and technical traders
In this section we demonstrate that, in a market with fundamental traders, there exists
a martingale equivalent probability measure that permits the risk neutral valuation of all
securities in the market. The possibility of risk neutral valuation leads technical traders
to enter in the market. For improving the clarity of the demonstration, we assume in the
following that the Brownian motion is 1-dimensional.
Definition 3 (technical traders’ assumption). Let Bt be a 1-dimensional Brownian
motion with respect to P, and Hs an adapted ca`dla`g process. The price process Equil(xt)
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can be approximated with the semimartingale Zt on (Ω,Ft,P), such that:
Equil(xt) ≈ Zt = Bt +
∫ t
0
Hs ds, (19)
with: Bt ∈ M
c
loc(P) := {all continuous local martingales with respect to P},
and:
∫ t
0
Hs ds ∈ FV := {all stochastic processes with finite variation}.
By adopting this approximation, agents can evaluate the security xt via the sophisticated
methods of martingale theory and stochastic calculus.
Proposition 3 (existence of an equivalent martingale measure). Let the price
process Zt be a semimartingale of 1-dimensional Brownian motion under the measure P.
Then, there exists a probability measure Q, equivalent to P, such that Equil(xt) ≈ Zt can
be represented as a continuous local martingale under Q.
∃Q ∼ P : Equil(xt) ≈ Zt = Bt +
∫ t
0
Hs ds ∈ M
c
loc(Q), (20)
with Bt ∈M
c
loc(P) and
∫ t
0
Hs ds ∈ FV .
Proof. The proposition is equivalent to the Girsanov theorem, that we briefly demonstrate.
Let be Q = E(L)t · P, and let E(L)t be the Radon-Nikodym derivative defined as:
E(L)t = exp
{
Lt −
1
2
〈L〉t
}
, (21)
where 〈L〉t is the quadratic variation of Lt and:
Lt = −
∫ t
0
Hs dBs. (22)
It results EP [E(L)t] ≡ 1. Moreover, E(L)t is a martingale, because it fulfills the sufficient
Novikov condition:
E
[
exp
{1
2
〈L〉t
}]
<∞, ∀ t. (23)
According to the Girsanov theorem, it results:
BQt = Bt − 〈B,L〉t ∈M
c
loc(Q), (24)
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where 〈B,L〉t is the covariation of Bt and Lt, with:
− 〈B,L〉t =
〈
B,
∫ t
0
Hs dBs
〉
t
=
∫ t
0
Hs d 〈B〉s =
∫ t
0
Hs ds. (25)
Then, it results:
− 〈B,L〉t =
∫ t
0
Hs ds ⇐⇒ B
Q
t = Zt ∈M
c
loc(Q). 2 (26)
From the preceding proof, it follows that (Zt)t∈[0,T ] is square integrable and that,
according to Le´vy theorem, it is a Brownian motion and its paths are of unbounded total
variation with respect to Q.
Please note that, in a market with only fundamental traders, the absence of arbitrage
and free lunch opportunities can be considered equivalent to the existence of an equiv-
alent probability measure Q under which the price processes of all securities become a
martingale.8
According to propositions 2 and 3, the existence of a market-clearing price in a market
with fundamental traders leads to the existence of a risk neutral probability measure Qt.
This permits the entrance of technical traders in the market.
Definition 4 (strategy of technical traders). We have given a security xt whose
price process Equil(xt) can be approximated with a semimartingale Zt. Then, risk neutral
agents will be indifferent whether to trade or not the security:
Equil(xt) ≈ Zt =⇒ EPt
[
Equil(xt+dt)
]
= EQ
[
Zt+dt
]
=⇒
=⇒
(
rˆit − Equil(xt), xˆ
i
t + xt
)
∼i
(
rˆit + Equil(xt), xˆ
i
t − xt
)
∼i
(
rˆit, xˆ
i
t
)
,
∀ i ∈ TB ∪TS. (27)
8 For a proof in markets with similar topological conditions, see for example: Kreps [29], Harrison and Pliska
[19], Heath and Jarrow [20], and Delbaen [10].
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Risk neutral agents who have chosen to buy the security xt will be willing to pay a price
Buy(xt) > Equil(xt):
Equil(xt) ≈ Zt ⇒ EQ
[
Zt+dt
]
< EPt
[
Equil(xt+dt)
∣∣∣ decision ofbuying xt
]
= Buy(xt) ⇒
=⇒
(
rˆit − Buy(xt), xˆ
i
t + xt
)
∼i
(
rˆit − Equil(xt)− ǫ, xˆ
i
t + xt
)
≻i
(
rˆit, xˆ
i
t
)
,
∀ i ∈ TB, ǫ > 0. (28)
Risk neutral agents who have chosen to sell the security xt will be willing to accept a price
Sell(xt) < Equil(xt):
Equil(xt) ≈ Zt ⇒ EQ
[
Zt+dt
]
> EPt
[
Equil(xt+dt)
∣∣∣ decision ofselling xt
]
= Sell(xt) ⇒
=⇒
(
rˆjt + Sell(xt), xˆ
j
t − xt
)
∼j
(
rˆjt + Equil(xt) + ǫ, xˆ
j
t − xt
)
≻j
(
rˆjt , xˆ
j
t
)
,
∀ j ∈ TS, ǫ > 0. (29)
As exposed in section 3.3, the element ǫ in formulae (28) and (29) can be interpreted
as the Bayesian updating of price expectations of technical agents due to their choice of
buying or selling. Moreover, we can interpret ǫ as a small sum that agents should add or
subtract to Equil (xt) to make sure that their market orders would be executed.
Risk neutral investors who trades randomly, according to the martingale equivalent
probability measure inferred from market prices, can be seen as a particular kind of noise
traders. They differ from the classical definition of noise traders in literature9 in the fact
that they are rational and informed. A consequence of proposition 3 and definition 4 is
that the market price function is no longer unbounded if technical traders are operating.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In a market with fundamental and technical traders, the price of the
security xt can assume a value outside the set of Pareto-efficient bargains of fundamental
traders.
Equil(xt)≈Zt ∧ ∃i∈TBt ∧ ∃j∈TSt ⇒ P
[
Equil(xt) /∈ Et
]
> 0, (30)
where TBt and TSt represent, respectively, the sets of technical buyers and technical
sellers at date t.
9 See for example: Black [2] and De Long et al. [9].
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Proof. Let us suppose that the clearing-market price for a security xt exists at date t
and is equal to the highest reservation price among buyers that are fundamental traders,
max[BidFB(xt)]. All sellers and at least one buyer among fundamental traders are then op-
erating; also, according to definition 4, risk neutral investors can choose to trade according
to the martingale equivalent probability measure that emerges from market prices.
Let us now suppose that at time t the number of technical traders for which:
Equil(x˜t) ≈ Zt, EPt
[
Equil(xt+dt)
∣∣ decision of
buying xt
]
> EQ
[
Zt+dt
]
, ∀ i ∈ TBt, (31)
exceeds the number of technical traders for which:
Equil(x˜t) ≈ Zt, EP
[
Equil(xt+dt)
∣∣ decision of
selling xt
]
< EQ
[
Zt+dt
]
, ∀ j ∈ TSt. (32)
This means that the number of technical traders who are willing to buy the security xt
at the market-clearing price, exceeds at date t the number of technical traders who are
willing to sell it. Thus, by assumption in section 3.4 and in definition 4, the market-
clearing price raises; then it can exceed max[BidFB(xt)] and it can exit form the space
of Pareto-efficient bargains Et. At the new price, no buyer that is fundamental trader is
operating. The price will increase until technical traders who are willing to buy exceeds
those who are willing to sell, and it will decrease vice versa. 2
4.4 Market conditions
According to the definition of the price process in formula (1) and to proposition 4, we
can now distinguish and quantitatively define the following different market conditions:
– non speculative market : it happens when, at a given date t, only fundamental traders
are operating. The market-clearing price of a security xt belongs to the set of Pareto-
efficient bargains Et. The price function becomes:
f : BidFB(xt)× AskFS(xt) 7→ Equil(xt) ∈ Et,
min[AskFS(xt)] ≤ Equil(xt) ≤ max[BidFB(xt)]. (33)
– normal market : it happens when, at a given date t, both fundamental and technical
traders are operating in the market and the market-clearing price of a security xt
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belongs to the set of Pareto-efficient bargains Et. The price function results:
f : BidFB(xt)×AskFS(xt)×BuyTB(xt)×SellTS(xt)×Equil(xt−dt) 7→Equil(xt)∈Et,
min[AskFS(xt)] ≤ Equil(xt) ≤ max[BidFB(xt)]. (34)
– market bubble: it happens when, at a given date t, the market-clearing price of a
security xt exceeds the highest reservation price among buyers that are fundamental
traders, max[BidFB(xt)]; thus, it is outside the set of Pareto-efficient bargains Et. Only
technical traders and sellers that are fundamental traders are operating in the market.
The price function becomes:
f : AskFS(xt)× BuyTB(xt)× SellTS(xt)× Equil(xt−dt) 7→ Equil(xt) /∈ Et,
Equil(xt) > max[BidFB(xt)]. (35)
– market depression: it happens when, at a given date t, the market-clearing price of a
security xt is below the lowest reservation price among sellers that are fundamental
traders, min[AskFS(xt)]; thus, it is outside the set of Pareto-efficient bargains Et. Only
technical traders and buyers that are fundamental traders are operating in the market.
The price function becomes:
f : BidFB(xt)× BuyTB(xt)× SellTS(xt)× Equil(xt−dt) 7→ Equil(xt) /∈ Et,
Equil(xt) < min[AskFS(xt)]. (36)
4.5 The risk neutral valuation paradox
Proposition 5. If technical traders stop operating in a market which is under bubble
conditions or under depression conditions, the market-clearing price of the security xt will
have a jump discontinuity. The new price will assume a value inside the set of Pareto-
efficient bargains of fundamental traders.
Proof. We first prove the proposition under market bubble conditions. Let us suppose
that, at date t, the market-clearing price of the security xt is outside the space of Pareto-
efficient bargains Et and exceeds the highest reservation price among buyers that are
fundamental traders, max[BidFB(xt)]. Thus, the market is experiencing a bubble.
Let us suppose that, while the market is still under bubble conditions, at some date
t˜ > t all technical traders stop operating. This event has a positive probabilities because
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the number of technical traders operating in the market varies randomly over time. The
left and right limits of the price function in the neighborhood of t˜ result:
lim
t→t˜−
[
f :AskFS(xt˜−)×BuyTB(xt˜−)×SellTS(xt˜−)×Equil(xt−dt) 7→ Equil(xt˜−)
]
,
Equil(xt˜−) > max[BidFB(xt˜−)], (37)
and:
lim
t→t˜+
[
f : BidFB(xt˜+)× AskFS(xt˜+) 7→ Equil(xt˜+)
]
,
min[AskFS(xt˜+)] ≤ Equil(xt˜+) ≤ max[BidFB(xt˜+)]. (38)
Then, the price function has a jump discontinuity at date t˜. Indeed, it results:
Equil(xt˜−) 6= Equil(xt˜+). (39)
The jump consists in a negative price shock:
Equil(xt˜−) > Equil(xt˜+). (40)
The proposition is then proved under market bubble conditions. It can be proved analo-
gously under market depression. 2
Please note that the market-clearing price Equil(xt) will have a jump discontinuity also
if all technical traders who are, alternatively, buyers or sellers will stop operating in a
market which is, respectively, under bubble or depression conditions.
Proposition 6 (risk neutral valuation paradox). Let us consider an incomplete mar-
ket for derivatives, which is frictionless, informationally efficient, and has competitive ra-
tional investors with different risk attitudes. Then, if some investors are risk neutral, the
market may exhibit almost surely cycles in which prices diverge from their fundamental
values, ended by abrupt price adjustments towards their fundamental values.
Proof. The demonstration logically follows from proposition 5. 2
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the role of risk neutral investors in generating endoge-
nous bubbles in derivatives markets. In an incomplete market for derivatives which has
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no arbitrage opportunities, it is indifferent to risk neutral investors whether to trade or
not and, in the first case, whether to buy or to sell any particular security. Hence, their
trading choices will vary randomly over time. Then, prices can diverge from their funda-
mental values but, whenever risk neutral investors stop trading, prices may have abrupt
adjustments towards their fundamental values.
Our main result consists in the demonstration of the existence of a price anomaly,
that we have called the risk neutral valuation paradox. The paradox is a consequence of
the fundamental theorem of asset pricing and the related martingale theory of bubbles.
It states that derivatives markets, which are informationally efficient, incomplete and
with some risk neutral investors, may exhibit violations to the Gaussian random walk
hypothesis. Furthermore, it suggests that extreme price movements like price peaks or
crashes may happen with a higher than-normal frequency.
The paradox may yield surprisingly concrete implications for the theory of financial
and derivatives markets. We suggest four possible advances. The first is that violations to
the random walk hypothesis can be compatible with informationally efficient markets. The
second is that the informative content of prices in almost perfect markets may decrease
when risk neutral investors are operating. The third is that risk neutral investors, even
when they are rational and informed, may stimulate the emergence of boom-and-bust
cycles. The fourth is that, under some circumstances, the distribution of price movements
in an almost perfect market may differ from a normal distribution.
A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. The most important
limitation lies in the fact that we have demonstrated the existence of the paradox in
a rather general setting. Indeed, a more precise definition of the price process will be
necessary to extend the results. Further work needs to be done to specify more carefully
how the random variations of the prices would look over time and to establish to what
extent the paradoxical effect is significant.
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